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The status-legitimacy hypothesis, which predicts that low-status groups will 
legitimise inequality more than high-status groups, has received inconsistent 
empirical support. To resolve this inconsistency, we hypothesised that low-status 
groups would display enhanced legitimation only when evaluating the fairness of the 
specific hierarchy responsible for their disadvantage. In a New Zealand-based 
probability sample (N = 6162), we found that low-status ethnic groups (Asians and 
Pacific Islanders) perceived ethnic-group relations to be fairer than the high-status 
group (Europeans). However, these groups did not justify the overall political system 
more than the high-status group. In fact, Māori showed the least support for the 
political system. These findings clarify when the controversial status-legitimacy 















The status-legitimacy hypothesis revisited: Ethnic-group differences in general 
and dimension-specific legitimacy 
 
Coercion is the least efficient means of obtaining order. 
—Ursula K. Le Guin, The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous Utopia (1974) 
 
 
 The dominance of one group in society over others is most effectively 
maintained when subordinate groups buy into unequal social arrangements and see 
them as legitimate. This prevents the dominant group from having to use hostile 
means of control to maintain their dominance, which would risk engendering 
resistance and conflict (Jackman, 1994).  While there is general consensus that high-
status groups justify their advantage in a variety of ways (often cajoling the groups 
they exploit using various ideologies; Jost, Wakslack, & Tyler, 2008; Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999), the question of whether low-status groups actively legitimise systems 
that disadvantage them is much more controversial (see Reicher, 2004; Rubin & 
Hewstone, 2004; cf. Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004).   
 One perspective that has advanced the idea of active legitimation among the 
disadvantaged is System Justification Theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994). It proposes 
that members of both high- and low-status groups share a general motivation to 
perceive existing social arrangements as fair and just. For low-status groups, this 
motivation arouses dissonance with the competing motives to advance their own 
personal and group interests (Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001). Accordingly, SJT makes 
the provocative prediction that in order to resolve this dissonance; the disadvantaged 
will sometimes be motivated to legitimise inequality even more strongly than 
members of advantaged groups (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003). Brandt 
(2013) dubbed this “the status-legitimacy hypothesis” (p. 765) – lower status will be 
associated with higher legitimation.  While two early studies found evidence for this 
	
effect (Henry & Saul, 2006; Jost, et al., 2003), other analyses have either failed to 
replicate the finding (e.g., Brandt, 2013), or have implied the opposite pattern (i.e. 
lower status, lower legitimacy; e.g., Lee, Pratto, & Johnson, 2011).  
 Given these inconsistent findings, the present study aims to provide additional 
data from a large, representative, national sample in New Zealand, to inform the on-
going debate over the robustness of status-legitimacy effects. Specifically, we 
investigate ethnic-group differences in perceptions of legitimacy. Jost et al. (2003), 
who provided the first direct test of these effects, acknowledged that they are unlikely 
to be universal. Instead, they are most likely to emerge in democratic societies with 
extensive civil liberties, a meritocratic culture, and high levels of inequality. New 
Zealand meets all of these criteria (as discussed in detail later). Therefore, a failure to 
replicate the status-legitimacy effect in this context would cast further doubt on its 
robustness and the dissonance-related mechanism thought to underlie it. On the other 
hand, a replication of the effect would help shed light on the circumstances under 
which low-status groups might legitimise the very systems that disadvantage them.  
 In addition to providing valuable data from a different cultural context, our 
study makes a key contribution to the conceptualisation and measurement of system 
justification. As we will argue, part of the empirical uncertainty surrounding the 
status-legitimacy effect might stem from (a) a lack of alignment between the status 
dimension being measured and the hierarchy being legitimised, and (b) an imprecise 
definition of what “legitimacy” entails in the context of dissonance-reduction. The 
logic of the dissonance argument suggests that the conflict being resolved is between 
the need to perceive systems as fair and the experience of unfairness within those 
systems. As such, status-legitimacy effects should be most likely to emerge when 
legitimacy is measured in terms of fairness, and when these fairness perceptions apply 
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to the hierarchy responsible for creating the status differences being assessed (what 
we will call “dimension-specific legitimation”).  
To test this thesis, we investigate the effects of ethnic-group status on the 
perceived fairness of ethnic-group relations. We also test an alternative model which 
operationalises legitimacy in a manner that does not allude to the fairness of specific 
hierarchies: general support for the political system (see Brandt, 2013). Thus, our 
study examines whether differences in how legitimacy is conceptualised account for 
the mixed empirical support for the status-legitimacy hypothesis.   
System Justification Theory 
 System Justification Theory proposes that socio-political behaviour is not only 
driven by self- and group-interest, but also by a motive to justify the status quo (Jost 
& Banaji, 1994; Jost, et al., 2001). Engaging in system justification allows people to 
fulfil their epistemic need for order and structure (Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & 
Galinsky, 2009) and accrues various affective benefits — including increased 
satisfaction with one’s situation, and reduced moral outrage, guilt and frustration in 
the face of inequality (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Osborne & Sibley, 2013; Wakslak, 
Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007).  Indeed, nearly two decades of research on system 
justification has provided support for the argument that there exists a general 
ideological motive to legitimize the status quo (see Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004 for a 
review).  For example, people use various ideologies and stereotypes to legitimize 
group-based differences in social status (Jost & Burgess, 2000), defend the status quo 
in response to threats to it (Ledgerwood, Mandisodza, Jost, & Pohl, 2011) and accept 
weak, pseudo-explanations for prevailing social inequality (Haines & Jost, 2000).  
A defining feature of the system-justification perspective is the proposition 
that this bias in favour of the system exists both among those who benefit from it, and 
	
among those who are disadvantaged by it (Jost et al., 2001). For members of high-
status groups, supporting the status quo is consistent with their personal and group 
interests. For low-status groups, however, supporting a system which disadvantages 
them is in direct conflict with their self- and group-interests. This is the central idea 
behind the “status-legitimacy hypothesis” (Brandt, 2013): under some circumstances, 
the dissonance between the system-justification motive and people’s self- and group-
interest will lead the disadvantaged to justify the system more than the advantaged. In 
the following sections, we clarify the rationale behind this hypothesis and analyse the 
existing evidence for and against it.  
Clarifying the Concept of Dissonance 
 The status-legitimacy hypothesis derives from an extension of Cognitive 
Dissonance Theory (Festinger, 1957) to the political domain (Jost et al., 2003). 
Research on cognitive dissonance has shown that people respond to inconsistencies in 
their thoughts, feelings and behaviours by bringing one of the inconsistent 
components into alignment with their remaining attitudes (Harmon-Jones & Mills 
1999). Jost et al. (2003) speculated that, in the political domain, “dissonance might 
arise from the contradictory cognitions that (a) the system is putting me (and my 
group) at a disadvantage, and (b) through our acquiescence, my group and I are 
contributing to the stability of the system” (p. 16). Under some circumstances, people 
might resolve this dissonance by justifying the system.  
 We argue that it is unnecessary to assume that the implicit realisation that one 
is contributing to one’s own disadvantage elicits dissonance. Instead, we argue that 
research on cognitive dissonance strongly implies that the conflict being resolved, 
rationalised, or justified arises from inconsistencies between features of people’s 
psychology (e.g., their beliefs, motives) and features of their experience (e.g., their 
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own or others’ behaviour, their social reality). For example, Festinger, Riecken and 
Schachter’s (1956) seminal work showed that, in response to failed predictions of an 
impending apocalypse, members of a UFO cult expressed even more fervent beliefs in 
their mythology. This resolved the dissonance between their apocalyptic beliefs and 
their experience of reality (which disconfirmed those beliefs). Similarly, people 
express greater commitment to a group after being subjected to harsh initiation rituals 
(Aronson & Mills, 1969; Gerard & Mathewson, 1966). The dissonance here is 
between their psychological motive for inclusion and their experience of abuse.  
Thus, from our perspective, the most appropriate interpretation of dissonance-
induction as it applies to political attitudes is the conflict elicited between the 
psychological motive identified by SJT (i.e., to perceive existing social arrangements 
as fair) and the experience of unfairness in the particular social system(s). It is this 
conflict that should, at least sometimes, yield the status-legitimacy effects 
hypothesised by the theory. In other words, the unfairness of being lower in status 
along a specific intergroup hierarchy should induce dissonance with the motive for 
fairness, leading people to shift their perceptions of fairness in favour of those 
hierarchies. By measuring legitimacy as support for broader systems (rather than 
beliefs about the fairness of specific hierarchies), previous analyses may have been 
ill-placed to detect manifestations of this dimension-specific dissonance (e.g., Brandt, 
2013).  
Measuring Legitimacy 
Part of the reason why research on the status-legitimacy effect has 
operationalised legitimacy in this broader sense is that SJT has often conflated two 
theoretically distinct, albeit related, processes: support for the status quo and 
legitimation of inequality. The theory’s central proposition is that there is a 
	
motivation to legitimise the status quo (Jost et al., 2004). Accordingly, SJT proposes 
that fulfilling this motivation necessitates the legitimation of inequality in the status 
quo (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). This process works well under the assumption that the 
political, economic and social systems in most societies are hierarchical and unequal. 
However, to the extent that particular systems are more equal than unequal, the 
legitimation of inequality will not be equivalent to the legitimation of the status quo. 
Indeed, Brandt and Reyna (2012) showed that a preference for inequality was related 
to support for the status quo in unequal countries, but not in countries with high levels 
of equality. 
Further, legitimation itself can involve processes that differ in the ways in 
which they achieve their purpose. Early work on legitimation acknowledged that 
subordinates could trust the decisions of authorities “independently of judgments of 
the correctness or acceptability” of the rationale behind those decisions (Simon, 1957, 
p. 125; see also Tyler, 2006).  In a recent review, Costa-Lopes, Dovidio, Pereira, and 
Jost (2013) defined legitimation as “psychological processes by which attitudes, 
behaviors, and social arrangements are justified as conforming to normative 
standards—including, but not limited to—standards of justice” (emphasis added, p. 
230). These definitions imply that any attitude or ideology that increases perceptions 
of normativity can be used to bolster the status quo, regardless of whether or not it 
involves arguments about the fairness of the system.   
If one accepts that legitimising inequality is theoretically distinct from 
legitimation of the status quo, and that legitimation can involve more than justice 
perceptions, then it becomes possible to conceive of ways that systems can be 
bolstered without making inequality seem fair. In systems already marked by 
inequality, mere attitudinal preferences for (a) unequal social relations or (b) 
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deference to authority and tradition will suffice (Brandt & Reyna, 2012). Individual 
differences in these preferences are indexed by the constructs of Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and Right Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1996) respectively. 
While it has been argued that SDO and RWA are legitimizing ideologies, they 
differ significantly from other ideologies that fall into this category (e.g., Belief in a 
just world, Protestant Work Ethic and Meritocracy; see Jost & Hunady, 2005). For 
example, the Belief in a Just World explains away inequality by asserting that people 
get what they deserve and deserve what they get (Lerner, 1980). The Protestant Work 
Ethic frames those with low status as lazy and those with high status as hard-working 
(Furnham, 1982). Meritocracy involves subscribing to the view that inequality arises 
from fair processes in which merit determines people’s outcomes (McCoy & Major, 
2007). In contrast, the items used to assess SDO and RWA offer no explanation for 
unequal outcomes being fair or deserved, but merely assess the degree to which 
people see such inequality as normative, desirable or inevitable.   
These two ways of bolstering the status quo are differentially appealing to 
subordinate and dominant group members. For dominant groups, opposition to 
equality serves their interests by maintaining the hierarchies from which they benefit 
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For subordinate group members, however, categorically 
opposing the principle of equality is less viable, as it conflicts with their group 
interests (e.g. Jost & Thompson, 2000). Not surprisingly then, a meta-analysis of 
status differences in the preference for inequality found that high-status groups were 
consistently higher on SDO than low-status groups (Lee et al., 2011).  
The pattern of status differences in authoritarianism is exactly the opposite. 
Low-status group members consistently show a greater preference for obedience to 
	
authority than high-status groups (e.g., Napier & Jost, 2008), possibly because it 
buffers them from the effects of stigma and social devaluation (Brandt & Henry, 
2011; Henry, 2011). An ironic consequence of this coping mechanism is that the 
authoritarian attitudes that protect them from the psychological effects of stigma can 
also engender support for the authority structures on society, thus bolstering the status 
quo (Sterner, 2009). Together, these findings suggest that when legitimacy is 
measured in terms of support for the political and economic status quo, the processes 
of authoritarianism and social dominance operating differently among high-and low-
status groups might occlude the dissonance-induced effects of low status.  
A Closer Look at the Evidence 
Consistent with this reasoning, a closer look at the three studies reporting 
direct tests of the status-legitimacy hypothesis reveals that the effects predicted by 
SJT are only found under two conditions: (a) when measuring ideological legitimation 
of the specific hierarchies relevant to the status dimension being analysed (i.e. 
dimension-specific legitimation), and (b) when legitimacy is measured as support for 
authoritarian governance (Jost et al., 2003, Study 1; Henry & Saul, 2006, analysis 2). 
We argue that the former is a true manifestation of dissonance-reduction, and will 
therefore be the focus of the present analysis. The latter is likely a reflection of the 
stigma-driven subscription to authoritarianism that has already been identified in the 
literature (e.g. Henry, 2011).   
 We start by considering the most recent study to assess the status-legitimacy 
hypothesis— a large-scale analysis by Brandt (2013). In a wide array of tests that 
used different status dimensions in large samples from across Europe and the United 
States, he found no support for a negative main effect of status on legitimacy 
(measured as trust in government and societal institutions). In line with our preceding 
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analysis, we see these measures as indexing general support for the status quo rather 
than dimension-specific legitimation of inequality, which might partly explain the 
average null effects across samples.  
 Nonetheless, trust in government could be seen as an index of the legitimation 
of specific hierarchies to the extent that the government is perceived as 
disproportionately serving the interests of one group over others. Given that most 
measures of governmental trust assess perceptions of corruption (see Brandt 2013, p. 
6), income might be one dimension along which negative effects of status on 
legitimacy can be expected to emerge. Indeed, Jost et al. (2003; Study 2) found 
evidence for the status-legitimacy effect when operationalising status as income. Low 
income Latinos expressed greater trust in the government (by believing it was run for 
the benefit of all rather than serving special interests) compared to high-income 
Latinos.  
 Brandt (2013) also acknowledged that while there was no main effect for 
status on legitimacy on average, there was considerable variability in the size and 
direction of the effects. In many of the analyses reported, effects consistent with the 
dissonance argument were observed. Nevertheless, this variation was not explained 
by any of the moderators in his analysis (e.g., inequality). We believe that a crucial 
moderator missing from this study was the extent to which the status dimension being 
measured aligned with the hierarchy being legitimised. For example, in countries 
where battles over government were explicitly fought along ethnic lines, the effects of 
low ethnic-group status on government trust might emerge. Consistent with this 
notion, Henry and Saul (2006) found that in Bolivia where politics and ethnicity are 
strongly entwined (Molina, 2007), low-status ethnic groups trusted the system more 
than high-status ethnic groups.  
	
 Further support for a dimension-specific legitimisation process can be found 
by analysing the situations in which status-legitimacy effects did and did not emerge 
in the seminal studies by Jost et al. (2003). In line with our distinction between 
bolstering the status quo and legitimising inequality, they found most support for the 
status-legitimacy hypothesis when measuring status differences in ideologies and 
beliefs that legitimised specific kinds of inequality. For example, in Study 3, they 
found that poor people were more likely than rich people to believe that large 
differences in income were necessary to motivate effort. Thus, it was a belief that 
legitimised income inequality that revealed status differences along the dimension of 
income.  
 In Study 4, Jost et al., (2003) operationalised status in terms of race, income 
and geographical location. Legitimacy was measured as support for statements that 
equated hard work with success and thus explained away status differences in terms 
of differences in effort (see Jost & Hunyady, 2002). The pattern of interactions in 
their findings reveals the highly specific nature of dissonance-based legitimation. 
There was no main effect for race, probably because legitimacy (i.e., the belief that 
hard work leads to success) in this context was not specifically about justifying racial 
inequality. However, in the South, where status differences in race and income align 
more strongly, status-legitimacy effects emerged. For example, poor African 
Americans in the South (but not in the North) endorsed legitimacy beliefs more than 
wealthy African Americans. This supports our argument that it is particularly when 
specific status differences are in need of legitimation that the dissonance-based 
mechanism should yield status-legitimacy effects.  
 The psychological benefits of subscribing to legitimising ideologies also seem 
to manifest in a dimension-specific manner. If dissonance arises from suffering 
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inequality while also being motivated to see society as fair, then processes of 
legitimation that help resolve this dissonance should buffer people’s psychological 
wellbeing (Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Indeed, several studies have found evidence for 
the palliative effects of legitimising ideologies for members of low-status groups (Jost 
et al., 2008; Osborne & Sibley, 2013; McCoy, Wellman, Cosley, Saslow, & Epel, 
2013). Relevant to our argument about dimensional specificity, Sengupta and Sibley 
(2014) found that subscribing to an ideology that delegitimises ethnic-group-based 
claims for reparation predicted increased wellbeing, but only among Māori (the low-
status ethnic group) living in conditions of high inequality. Thus, it is precisely those 
who had the most to lose from ideologically legitimising inequality that accrued 
psychological benefits from doing so.  
The Present Study 
 Here we present a test of the status-legitimacy hypothesis by analysing ethnic-
group differences in two kinds of legitimacy beliefs (namely, support for the political 
system, and the perceived fairness of ethnic-group relations) in a large, national, 
probability sample in New Zealand (N = 6162). The measures in our survey, and the 
cultural context in which it was conducted, offer a unique opportunity to investigate 
some of the questions that lie at the heart of the debate over whether the victims of 
inequality bolster the very systems that disadvantage them. Jost et al. (2003) outlined 
three important boundary conditions for the dissonance-reduction mechanism 
hypothesised to drive status-legitimacy effects.  
First, if the motive to justify the system competes with the self- and group-
interests of the disadvantaged, then the effects of dissonance would be more likely to 
emerge when the salience of these interests is relatively low. Jost et al. (2003) argued 
that large-scale surveys are one condition under which the motives for advancement 
	
of the self and the ingroup are low, since people are responding to myriad questions, 
most of which have nothing to do with their group memberships or system-related 
beliefs. The New Zealand Attitudes and Values Survey (NZAVS), from which our 
data are drawn, consists of over 200 items assessing a wide range of variables, 
including personality, health, environmental attitudes, voting behaviour etc. Thus, our 
methodology satisfies the first boundary condition by not strongly triggering 
individual- and group-level motives at the expense of system-level motives.  
Second, dissonance research suggests that when people freely choose their 
behaviour, the need to rationalise the given act is enhanced (e.g., Cooper & Fazio, 
1984). Accordingly, Jost et al. (2003) proposed that dissonance about the system 
would most likely be elicited when people feel that they have a say in how the system 
is constituted. Thus, democratic societies with extensive civil liberties represent a 
favourable testing ground for status-legitimacy effects. New Zealand was ranked fifth 
on an index assessing the robustness of a country’s democratic institutions (EIU, 
2012) and first on an index of human freedom (McMahon, 2012).  
Further, like other postcolonial Western societies, New Zealand has a 
meritocratic culture in that people subscribe to various ideologies that frame issues of 
distributive justice in terms of individual deservingness (e.g., Sibley & Liu, 2007; 
Sibley, 2010). Jost et al., (2003) suggest that this type of cultural context will produce 
“strong motivational pressures for disadvantaged group members to provide 
attitudinal support for the system” (p. 17). Thus, the disadvantaged in New Zealand 
are more likely to engage in processes of legitimation than low-status groups in more 
authoritarian societies, or in cultures with weaker meritocratic norms. 
 Finally, because it is the experience of inequality that is hypothesised to elicit 
dissonance, status-legitimacy effects should be more likely to emerge in societies with 
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a higher level of inequality (Brandt, 2013). While New Zealand is less unequal than 
the United States, it has experienced the sharpest rise in inequality in the OECD over 
the past 20 years (OECD, 2012). Much of this inequality exists along ethnic lines. The 
Social Report (2010) by The Ministry of Social Development revealed that compared 
to European New Zealanders (the ethnic majority group), Māori, Pacific and Asian 
people fair worse on a host of socioeconomic indicators including income, 
employment, literacy rate and political representation. Members of these groups also 
experience worse health outcomes (e.g., higher mortality; The Social Report, 2010) 
and report lower wellbeing (Ajwani, Blakely, Robson, Tobias, & Bonne, 2003) 
compared to Europeans. These inequalities create an ethnic status-hierarchy that, 
when combined with the other features of the New Zealand context noted above, 
represent a favourable context in which to test if the dissonance-based effects of low-
status on perceptions of legitimacy occur in a manner consistent with the predictions 
of SJT.  
Specifically, we will test whether ethnic minorities show higher levels of 
legitimation than New Zealand Europeans. In line with our argument that dissonance 
should manifest in terms of a specific kind of legitimation (i.e., fairness perceptions) 
and in relation to specific hierarchies, we test ethnic-group differences in the belief 
that ethnic-group relations in New Zealand are fair. To provide support for our 
argument that past explorations have operationalised legitimacy in a manner that 
occludes the effects of dissonance, we also test status differences in the belief that the 
New Zealand political system operates as it should (analogous to measures such as 
trust or confidence in government that have been used in prior analyses). Consistent 
with Brandt’s (2013) analysis, we expect that this general form of system justification 
	
will be less likely to bear out the status-legitimacy hypothesis than the specific 
legitimation of ethnic-group differences.  
Finally, while we expect status-legitimacy effects for Asian and Pacific people 
on the dimension-specific measure, we predict that Māori, the indigenous peoples of 
New Zealand, will show lower levels of both support for the political system and 
perceived fairness of ethnic-group relations. This is because the nature of Māori 
identity has important implications for the way in which any potential dissonance 
might be resolved. 
The Political Nature of Māori Identity 
Jost et al. (2003) noted that resolving dissonance in favour of the system is 
only one potential option. Alternatively, when faced with the conflict between the 
motivation to perceive the system as fair and the experience of inequality, a person 
could acknowledge the systemic origins of their disadvantage. Justifying the status 
quo is often the psychologically easier route, as people are apt to feel helpless in the 
face of systemic inequality (Jost et al., 2008). However, when anti-systemic norms 
exist, it should be easier to resolve the dissonance between felt inequality and one’s 
motivation to view society as fair by challenging rather than rationalising inequality 
in the system.  
Among disadvantaged groups, such norms are reflected in the content of their 
ingroup identity (Thomas & Louis, 2013). Research on the content on Māori identity 
has shown that “sociopolitical consciousness” forms a core aspect of what it means to 
be Māori. For example, Houkamau and Sibley (2010) showed that a dimension 
indexing the perceived relevance of historical injustice to contemporary Māori and the 
willingness to engage in political action to advance Māori interests was more strongly 
linked to ethnic-identity centrality among Māori than other dimensions such as 
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cultural efficacy or spirituality. In a similar vein, Sibley (2010) showed that Māori are 
strongly opposed to ideologies that deny the relevance of historical injustice to 
contemporary issues of resource distribution in society.  
Such a highly politicised ethnic identity leads us to expect that Māori would 
be more able than other disadvantaged groups in New Zealand (cf. Manuela & Sibley, 
2013) to resolve their dissonance by favouring their group. This dovetails with 
research from the Social Identity tradition showing that identifying strongly with a 
disadvantaged group increases the motivation to collectively resist unequal systems, 
especially when the content of the group identity is highly political in nature (Thomas 
McGarty, & Mavor, 2009; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Simon & 
Klandermans, 2001). Thus, consistent with their group interests, Māori should show 





The NZAVS-2009 questionnaire was posted to 40,500 participants from the 
2009 NZ electoral roll and sampled a total of 6,518 participants. The overall response 
rate (adjusting for address accuracy of the electoral roll and including anonymous 
responses) was 16.6%.  
Participant details 
Complete responses to the items analysed here were provided by 6162 
participants (95% of the sample; 3669 women, 2493 men). Of those providing 
complete data, 73% were New Zealand European (n = 4501), 17.6% were Māori (n = 
1083), 4.4% were of Pacific Nations ancestry (n = 274), and 4.9% were of Asian 
	
ancestry (n = 304). Participants’ who were coded as belonging to ‘other’ ethnicities 
were not included in the analyses. Participants’ mean age was 47.93 (SD =15.78). 
80% of the European respondents, 98% of the Māori respondents, 51% of the Pacific 
respondents and 17% of the Asian respondents were born in New Zealand.  
Measures 
General support for the political system (conceptually analogous to measures 
of “trust in government” used in previous analysis) was measured using the following 
item from Kay and Jost’s (2003) general system justification scale: “In general, the 
New Zealand political system operates as it should.” For dimension-specific 
legitimation, the following item from the gender-specific system justification scale 
developed by Jost and Kay (2005) was revised to assess the fairness of ethnic-group 
relations: “In general, relations between different ethnic groups in New Zealand are 
fair”. Both items were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). We also assessed whether people were born in New Zealand to 
adjust for the effects of immigrant-status. 
Results 
Primary Model 
A 2 (System Legitimacy: General vs. Specific) x 4 (Ethnicity) mixed-model 
ANOVA was conducted, with type of system-legitimacy (either general support for 
the political system or perceived fairness of ethnic-group relations) as the within-
subjects factor and ethnicity as the between-subjects factor. Owing to our large 
sample, the p-value for all effects was set at .001. As predicted, there was a significant 
main effect for ethnicity (F(3, 6158) = 31.33, p < .001, partial µ2 = .02) indicating 
that people of different ethnic groups differed in the extent to which they believed the 
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New Zealand political system operates as it should, and that ethnic-group relations are 
fair.  
We also found a significant main effect for type of system-legitimacy (F(1, 
6158) = 69.46, p < .001, partial µ2 = .01) indicating that levels of support for the 
overall political system differed from levels of perceived fairness of the ethnic-group 
system. This effect occurred because people were higher on perceptions of fairness of 
ethnic-group relations (M = 4.44, SE = .03) than on general support for the political 
system (M = 4.17, SE = .03).   
Finally, the interaction between type of system-legitimacy and ethnicity was 
significant (F(3, 6158) = 34.00, p < .001, partial µ2 = .02) indicating that the 
difference in levels of support for the political system and levels of perceived fairness 
of ethnic-group relations was contingent on participants’ ethnicity (see Figure 1). 
Analysis of the simple effects revealed that Māori (MD = .43, SE = .05, p < .001), 
Pacific (MD = .56, SE = .11, p < .001) and Asian people (MD = .37, SE = .10, p < 
.001) were significantly higher on levels of perceived fairness of ethnic-group 
relations, relative to levels of support for the political system. However, there was no 
difference in the two types of legitimacy perceptions among Europeans.  
For political-system support, Bonferonni post-hoc comparisons revealed that 
the effect of ethnicity occurred because Māori (M = 3.73, SD = 1.54) were 
significantly lower than Europeans (M = 4.27, SD = 1.39, p < .001; Cohen’s d = -.37), 
Asian (M = 4.29, SD = 1.39, p < .001; Cohen’s d = -.38) and Pacific people (M = 
4.18, SD = 1.59, p < .001; Cohen’s d  = -.29). In contrast, there were no significant 
differences in levels of support for the political system between the European, Asian 
and Pacific groups. This is consistent with our hypothesis that status-legitimacy 
effects would not emerge when measuring levels of general support for the political 
	
status quo. It is also consistent with the hypothesis that the group whose identity was 
most politicised (i.e., Māori) would show lower levels of support for the political 
system than all other ethnic groups.  
For the perceived fairness of ethnic-group relations, post-hoc analyses 
revealed that the effect of ethnicity occurred because Europeans (M = 4.21, SD = 
1.37) displayed lower average levels than Asians (M = 4.65, SD = 1.36, p < .001; 
Cohen’s d = -.32) and Pacific Islanders (M = 4.73, SD = 1.51, p < .001; Cohen’s d = -
.36). Further, Māori (M = 4.16, SD = 1.48) also displayed lower levels of perceived 
fairness of ethnic-group relations than Asians (Cohen’s d = -.34) and Pacific Islanders 
(Cohen’s d = -.38). There were no significant differences in the levels of perceived 
fairness between Māori and Europeans (Cohen’s d = -.04), or between Asian and 
Pacific people (Cohen’s d = -.06). This is consistent with our prediction that status-
legitimacy effects would only emerge when measuring dimension-specific 
legitimation, and when legitimation is operationalised in terms of fairness 
perceptions. However, the hypothesis that Māori would show lower levels of 
perceived fairness was not supported. Thus, even the group with the most highly 
politicised identity legitimised the ethnic-group relations at least as much as the 
dominant ethnic group.  
Covariate Adjusted Model 
To examine the robustness of our findings, we reanalysed our data using a 2 
(System Legitimacy) x 4 (Ethnicity) mixed-model ANCOVA, adjusting for the effects 
of immigrant-status (i.e., whether were people were born in New Zealand). This is 
because a large proportion of the Asian and Pacific groups in New Zealand are first-
generation immigrants. Therefore, our findings might reflect the effects of 
immigration-status on ethnic-group legitimation. That is, indigenous New Zealanders 
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and recent arrivals might be engaging in different types of comparisons (i.e., to an 
imagined ideal versus to their home country) when evaluating the fairness of New 
Zealand society.  
Contrary to this alternative hypothesis, we found that Māori (M = 3.78, SD = 
1.54) remained significantly lower on support for political system than Europeans (M 
= 4.28, SD = 1.39, p < .001; Cohen’s d = -.34), Asians (M = 4.15, SD = 1.38, p < 
.001; partial Cohen’s d = -.25) and Pacific people (M = 4.11, SD = 1.59, p < .001; 
Cohen’s d = -.21). There were no significant differences in levels of support for the 
political system between the European, Asian and Pacific groups. Similarly for 
dimension-specific legitimation, we again found that Europeans (M = 4.22, SD = 
1.37) displayed lower average levels of perceived fairness of ethnic-group relations 
than Asians (M = 4.60, SD = 1.34, p < .001; Cohen’s d = -.28) and Pacific Islanders 
(M = 4.71, SD = 1.50, p < .001; Cohen’s d = -.34), even after taking into account 
immigration status. Further Māori (M = 4.18, SD = 1.48) also displayed lower levels 
of perceived fairness of ethnic-group relations than Asians (Cohen’s d = -.30) and 
Pacific Islanders (Cohen’s d = -.36), after accounting for immigration status. There 
were no significant differences in the levels of perceived fairness between Māori and 
Europeans (Cohen’s d = -.03), or between Asian and Pacific people (Cohen’s d = -
.08). Thus, the pattern of group differences in these two forms of legitimacy obtained 
in the preceding analysis remained unaffected after adjusting for immigrant-status. 
  
Discussion 
 We aimed to test the conditions under which the controversial status-
legitimacy effects hypothesised by System Justification Theory would and would not 
emerge. Using a large national sample in a highly democratic country (namely, New 
	
Zealand), we showed that some low-status groups do indeed show enhanced 
legitimacy beliefs compared to the high-status group. Members of the Asian and 
Pacific minority groups in New Zealand believed that ethnic-group relations were 
fairer than did their European New Zealand counterparts. Overall, this lends support 
to the notion that a dissonance-based explanation might help account for why the 
disadvantaged sometimes legitimise the very inequalities from which they suffer. It 
also suggests that Brandt’s (2013) conclusion that “the status-legitimacy effect is not 
robust” (p. 11) might be premature.  
 We believe that this conclusion follows from analyses that do not adequately 
consider the type of legitimation that would reflect dissonance-reduction processes. 
Specifically, we argued that dissonance is most likely to result from experiencing low 
relative status (i.e., unfair disadvantage) within a particular intergroup hierarchy. 
Justification processes aimed at resolving this dissonance should therefore manifest as 
increased perceptions of the fairness of that particular hierarchy. Consistent with this 
argument, we found that Asian and Pacific people showed higher levels of 
legitimation than Europeans only when evaluating the fairness of the ethnic-group 
hierarchy under which they suffer. They did not trust the functioning of the general 
political system any more or less than the dominant group. Presumably, the 
legitimation of the broader system can be accomplished in ways that do not involve 
framing it as fair, and thus do not trigger mechanisms for the reduction of 
psychological conflict between unfair experiences and the fairness motive.  
  Following Jost et al. (2003), we do not contend that this tendency to resolve 
dissonance in a direction that bolsters intergroup hierarchies is universal. Indeed, it is 
unlikely that the disadvantaged will always be the ones who most strongly support 
unequal systems. Clearly unfair social arrangements do get challenged, overthrown or 
23 
reformed, often by those adversely affected by these arrangements (Reicher, 2011). 
However, our findings demonstrate that, under some circumstances, low-status groups 
can rationalise status hierarchies more than the groups who benefit from them. 
Specifically, in democratic nations with high inequality and extensive civil liberties, 
disadvantaged groups whose identities do not include anti-systemic norms might be 
driven to believe that the hierarchies responsible for their lower status are fairer than 
high-status groups believe them to be.  
Our findings also help highlight another important boundary condition for the 
status-legitimacy hypothesis. Consistent with the social identity perspective on 
collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008; Simon & Klandermans, 2001), we found 
that Māori (a group whose identity is highly politicised) show lower support for the 
political system than all other groups. Further, unlike Asian and Pacific people, they 
show no more legitimation of the ethnic-group system than the dominant group. 
However, it should also be noted that, somewhat inconsistent with the collective 
action perspective, their politicised identity did not cause them to display lower levels 
of dimension-specific legitimation. Māori still legitimised ethnic-group relations at 
least as much as the group that benefits from the ethnic-group hierarchy.  
Limitations 
 Since these data were drawn from a much larger survey, we were necessarily 
constrained in the comprehensiveness of the measures used. The use of one-item 
measures for all constructs in the analysis adversely affected the reliability with which 
we could assess these beliefs. Further, we only compared status effects along one 
dimension – ethnicity. We chose this dimension because much of the inequality in 
New Zealand exists along ethnic lines. Future research should extend the analyses 
reported here by examining legitimation along other status dimensions and with more 
	
comprehensive measures of legitimacy. Despite these issues, our survey had the 
advantage of including items that tapped both general/political and dimension-specific 
legitimation, thereby enabling us to test our argument about why past explorations of 
the status-legitimacy hypothesis have been inconclusive. Further, testing status-
legitimacy effects on a large, nationally representative sample from an as-yet 
unexplored intergroup context adds valuable information to the international literature 
on this highly contentious topic.  
 There are also some competing explanations for our findings that our analyses 
cannot conclusively rule out. One such explanation is that belonging to collectivist 
cultures makes Asian and Pacific people more prone to justifying the system than 
Māori who, it could be argued, might be more acculturated to individualistic New 
Zealand society. It has been found, for example, that people from collectivist cultures 
are more tolerant of hierarchy and inequality in the social structure (Lee al., 2011). 
So, it might be this cultural difference, rather than increased dissonance, that explains 
why Pacific and Asian people justify the status quo more strongly than Europeans. 
However, the fact that Māori and Pacific people share a common (Polynesian) 
cultural heritage, yet show very different levels of system justification, undercuts this 
argument.  
 Further, it could be argued that because Asian and Pacific people are recent 
immigrant groups in New Zealand, they engage in a different type of comparison 
when assessing the fairness of the New Zealand system. While indigenous New 
Zealanders might compare the current system to an imagined ideal, immigrants may 
compare it to the system in their country of origin.  However, this explanation 
assumes that the comparison being made by immigrants is an advantageous one – i.e., 
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that they are judging ethnic-group relations in New Zealand to be fairer than their 
home country.  
While plausible, there is at least one reason to suspect that this explanation 
does not account for our findings. Asian and Pacific people often belong to the ethnic 
majority (and thus the advantaged group) in their country of origin. When they move 
to New Zealand, they experience a drop in status relative to their status in their home 
country. Therefore, it is equally possible that when compared to their home country, 
immigrants would experience ethnic-group relations as being less fair because they 
find themselves near the bottom of the ethnic-group hierarchy. This sharper 
experience of relative unfairness would then spark even more dissonance, resulting in 
higher levels of legitimation. However, we obtained the same pattern of group 
differences when re-running our analyses while adjusting for whether people were 
born in New Zealand. This indicates that comparisons with a home country (either 
advantageous or disadvantageous) are not likely to be driving the effects observed in 
our study.  
Finally, we have argued that in order to tap manifestations of ideological 
dissonance, measures of legitimacy must be (a) dimension-specific and (b) assess 
fairness perceptions. Our particular measures, however, cannot establish conclusively 
that both these features are essential; the ethnic-specific measure contains both 
elements while the general measure contains neither. Therefore, it is possible that 
measures that assess general fairness perceptions might also yield status-legitimacy 
effects. If so, this would suggest that the effects of dissonance for low-status groups 
generalise to systems beyond the group-based hierarchy directly responsible for their 
relative status-disadvantage. It is also possible that measures of domain-specific 
legitimacy unrelated to perceptions of fairness might yield status-legitimacy effects 
	
(although see Lee et al., 2011 for evidence against this possibility). This would mean 
that being low-status along a particular hierarchy leads people to support the system 
in ways that extend beyond framing it as fair. Both possibilities imply that the 
legitimation of one’s own disadvantage occurs even more widely than our 
observations allow us to conclude. 
Conclusion 
 In this study, we have shown that low-status groups can sometimes display 
higher perceptions of legitimacy than the high-status group. We also showed that 
these effects occur specifically when evaluating the fairness of the hierarchy along 
which status differences exist. Further, we provided evidence for an additional 
boundary condition for these effects – the content of the low-status group’s identity. 
When norms that acknowledge the illegitimacy of group-based disadvantage and 
promote collective action define a group’s identity, the need to legitimise unfairness is 
probably less stark. Overall, our findings suggest that there may be some dissonance 
between experiences of unfairness and the motive for fairness that sometimes leads 
people to legitimise their own disadvantage. This finding implies that those who have 
the most to gain from social change may be prevented from recognizing that such 
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Figure 1. Clustered bar-graph showing levels of political and ethnic system 
justification in the four major ethnic groups of New Zealand. Note. For the purposes 
of visual clarity, the X-axis displays system justification scores between 3 and 5. The 
actual range for the two system justification scales used was 1-7 (error bars represent 
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